It is commonly understood that Countable Choice holds constructively due to the underlying computational nature of constructivism. However, in this paper we demonstrate that invoking different notions of computation result in radically different behaviors regarding Countable Choice. In particular, we illustrate that, although deterministic computation guarantees Countable Choice, non-deterministic computation can negate Countable Choice. We then further show that using stateful computation can restore Countable Choice even in the presence of non-determinism. This finding suggests that much of the modern discourse of constructivism assumes a deterministic underlying computational system, despite non-determinism being a fundamental aspect of modern-day computation.
Introduction
As software has grown increasingly critical to our society's infrastructure, mechanically verified software has grown increasingly important, feasible, and prevalent. Proof assistants such as Coq [5] , Agda [8] , Twelf, and Nuprl [1, 14] are some of the most popular tools for mechanical verification. Each of these proof assistants sits on top of a computational system that embodies the mathematical philosophy of constructivism "under which an object exists only if we can construct it" [9] . In proof assistants, construction is done through programs via a tight correspondence to proofs often referred to as the proofs-as-programs paradigm [2] .
This paradigm, most famously exhibited by the BHK interpretation, grounds constructivism in computation [43] . Yet there are many different notions of computation. While Turing machines and the λ-calculus crosscut these notions, even they have some subtlety. For example, an algorithm is required to terminate on all inputs, but the definition of termination varies in non-classical settings. One definition gives Markov's Principle [28] , where an iterative computation terminates if it cannot proceed indefinitely; another definition gives Bar Induction [12] , where a recursive computation terminates if every possible recursion path encounters a base case; and there are yet more definitions. Thus it is well known that some constructive principles depend on the specifics of what one considers to entail computation [9] .
Nonetheless, some principles are often considered to transcend such details about computation, meaning their verity or falsity is independent of the particular notion of computation employed. A notable example is Countable Choice (CC), which is widely accepted amongst contructivists [7, 9, 25, 32, 33, 36 , 44], though not universally [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] . Put simply, CC states that any total relation from the natural numbers has a corresponding function exhibiting the totality of that relation. It has been shown that CC holds for any model of type theory standardly constructed from any model of the λ-calculus-more specifically from any partial combinatory algebra [15, 17, 47] -and as such is independent of factors such as a particular definition of termination. In essence, the computation realizing the proof of totality itself describes the desired choice function. This example is particularly important to constructivism because CC is often relied upon to achieve what classically would be done through the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). For example, without CC and LEM the types (not to be confused with setoids) of (modulated) Cauchy reals are not necessarily Cauchy complete, nor are they necessarily equivalent to the Dedekind reals [27] . CC unifies the most common constructive formulations of the reals, namely the Cauchy, modulated Cauchy, and Dedekind reals [10] .
This paper is electronically published in Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science URL: www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs However, in this paper we illustrate that the standard justification for CC makes an implicit assumption about computation, one that underlies much of the discourse of constructivism. That assumption is that the computation used to construct an object (in order to show it exists) is deterministic. Indeed, the computational systems underlying every major proof assistant are all deterministic. While some systems such as Coq rely on canonicalization to achieve decidable type-checking, even undecidable extensional systems like Nuprl have coincidentally all made their computational systems deterministic. That is, while there is significant research in constructively modeling and reasoning about non-deterministic computation, non-deterministic computation has not itself been directly incorporated into the computational systems underlying proof assistants.
We show how non-deterministic computation can be soundly incorporated into these computational systems. In fact, the standard computational models of type theory trivially extend to non-deterministic computationnone of the definitions or proofs for these models were truly utilizing the deterministic assumption. However, the same is not true for principles that were derived from these standard models. For example, we show that adding even a modicum of non-determinism, in the form of a possibilistic coin flip, not only makes CC no longer hold in the model, it in fact makes the negation of CC hold. This formally supports Schuster's philosophical concern that CC would be incompatible with non-deterministic extensions to constructivism [41] .
Non-determinism is just one example of effectful computation. Thus, we also consider the impact of stateful computation on constructive models. We show that, in addition to still forming a consistent model of type theory, stateful computation can be used to restore CC even in the presence of non-determinism. This is because state can be used to memoize [29] computations. Thus CC can be implemented by memoizing the computation contained in the proof of totality. This suggests that constructive systems wanting to directly support (rather than just model) probabilistic or non-deterministically parallel algorithms should also support some form of state as well in order to be consistent with CC and the unification of the reals.
Background
While our discussion will be focused on constructive type theory, we want our findings to be relevant to set theory as well, and so we must discuss type theories with appropriate expressivenes. Since we will be building multiple such type theories to evaluate the various impacts of effects, to focus on the computational aspects of these theories we rely on known tools to generate the boilerplate. To this end we provide background on topos theory and tripos theory corresponding to models of type/set theory and higher-order logic.
From Set Theory to Topos Theory
In order to be comparable to common set theories, a type theory needs to exhibit certain important properties. One is that proofs must be irrelevant but not erased, meaning proofs can be used in computations so long as the result of the computation does not depend on the specifics of the proof. This enables functions to correspond to total and determined relations. Another is extensionality of entailment, i.e. that equality on predicates is extensional. This enables the correspondence between functions and total, determined relations to be bijective. Lastly, propositions must be impredicative, meaning there is a type/set (not just universe) of propositions, denoted Ω. This enables the construction of powersets.
Altogether these requirements place us in the setting of (elementary) topos theory [23] . Toposes are well established to form models of both set theory and extensional dependent type theories with impredicative propositions [34] . More specifically, since we here focus on Countable Choice, we work within the context of W -topos theory, i.e. toposes with a natural-number object modeling the natural numbers.
From Tripos Theory to Topos Theory
We will be particularly interested in toposes constructed from triposes [19, 35] . A tripos is a model of higherorder logic whose type theory is modeled by sets and functions.
1 Higher-order logic has a simple type theoryunit, pairs, and functions-and a predicate logic formed by , ⊥, conjunction, disjunction, implication, equality, and universal and existential quantification. Importantly, the type theory also includes a type, Ω, of propositions, whose terms correspond to propositions in the predicate logic. Thus, higher-order logic provides a means of abstractly reasoning about relations, including impredicative quantification over propositions.
Given a tripos modeling higher-order logic (or more generally a higher-order fibration [20, Definition 5.3 .1] 2 ), one can construct a topos via the "tripos-to-topos construction" [19] . Whereas the tripos models a simple type theory, the resulting topos is well established to model a dependent type theory. And whereas the tripos might not model extensionality of entailment, the resulting topos necessarily will. Thus the tripos-to-topos construction enables us to work in a simpler setting, with the more complex constructions being automatically generated for us.
Since this construction is standard, we only review the key components. First, an object in the constructed topos is given by a pair I, ≈ I of a type I and a partial-equivalence relation ≈ I on I × I in the tripos. Second, a morphism in the constructed topos from I, ≈ I to J, ≈ J is a relation R on I ×J that respects ≈ I and ≈ J in the tripos. This relation must be total, meaning ∀i : I. i ≈ I i ⊃ ∃j : J. i R j holds in the tripos, and determined, meaning ∀i : I, j, j : J. i R j ∧ i R j ⊃ j ≈ J j holds in the tripos. Furthermore, two morphisms are considered equal if their relations are equivalent in the tripos, effectively baking in extensionality of entailment.
Realizability Toposes and Triposes
The tripos-to-topos construction is often used for building realizability models [24, 47] of (extensional, impredicative) dependent type theory. In particular, a realizability topos is a topos that is constructed from a realizability tripos, where a realizability tripos is a tripos that is constructed from a partial combinatory algebra (of codes) through a process we discuss in Section 3.2. The key intuition is that a predicate on a set I specifies for each element i of I which codes (if any) "realize" that the predicate holds for i. This means that an object in the resulting realizability topos is a set I (from the metatheory) along with a relation i ≈ I i specifying which codes (if any) are considered to realize that i and i are equal. A common example takes I to be set of natural numbers N and takes n ≈ N n to be realized solely by the Church encoding of n when n and n are equal, and by nothing otherwise. Thus objects in a realizability topos conceptually specify a set I along with a computational interpretation of equality on I.
Another example is the object representing the powerset of natural numbers. For this object the set I is the set of predicates on N in the tripos. The predicate ≈ I states that a code realizes that two predicates φ and ψ are equivalent if it can convert any realizer of φ(n) into the Church encoding of n and it can convert any realizer of φ(n) into a realizer of ψ(n) and vice versa. Thus two predicates are considered equivalent if they are computationally strict, i.e. there is a computation that can extract the natural number for which the realizer holds, and computationally equivalent, i.e. there is a computation that can convert between the realizers.
Note that ≈ I is not reflexive since there may not be a way to computationally realize that a predicate is strict. Hence, the predicate i ≈ I i is often called the "existence predicate" for i as it indicates that i "exists". The definition of morphisms is designed so that they conceptually need only handle elements that exist according to this existence predicate.
Relating Topos and Tripos Models of Higher-Order Logic
A topos has an internal model of higher-order logic given by its subobjects, i.e. subsets [20, Corollary 5.4.9] . When a topos is constructed from a tripos, the internal model of the topos is closely related to the associated tripos. In particular, (equivalence classes of) subobjects of I, ≈ I in the topos bijectively correspond to (equivalence classes of) predicates on I that are strict with respect to ≈ I in the tripos [20, Proposition 6.1.6(ii)]. As such, the interpretations of many propositional connectives, like conjunction, coincide in the two models.
However, there are some differences between these models. For example, the quantification ∀i : I, ≈ I . φ(i) in the topos corresponds to the quantification ∀i : I. i ≈ I i ⊃ φ(i) in the tripos, and similarly ∃i : I, ≈ I . φ(i) in the topos corresponds to ∃i : I. i ≈ I i ∧ φ(i) in the tripos [20, Proposition 6.1.6(iii)]. That is, whenever the topos quantifies over an element i : I, ≈ I , the translation of that quantification in the tripos quantifies over an element of i : I and insists that i "exists", i.e. i ≈ I i. This step in the translation is particularly important for realizability toposes since it means that proofs of ∀i : I, ≈ I . φ(i) can have access to a realizer that i "computationally exists", i.e. i ≈ I i, and that proofs of ∃i : I, ≈ I . φ(i) must provide a realizer that i "computationally exists".
Countable Choice in a Tripos
CC has an internal and an external definition in topos theory that correspond to internal and external CC in set theory [23, 45] . In this paper we discuss internal CC because we are concerned about whether it can be used within the theory. Definition 2.1 (Internal CC for Topos) CC holds internally in a W -topos when the following holds in its internal model of higher-order logic for all objects τ :
In this paper we focus on toposes constructed from triposes, so we focus on this definition's counterpart in tripos theory. Definition 2.2 (Internal CC for Tripos) CC holds internally in a tripos when the following holds in its internal model of higher-order logic for all sets I:
where
Lemma 2.3 A W -topos constructed from a tripos internally models CC iff the tripos internally models CC.
Proof In the case where τ is of the form I, = I , this follows easily from interpreting Definition 2.1 in the model of strict predicates of the tripos, which is equivalent to the internal model of the topos constructed from that tripos [20, Proposition 6.1.6(ii)]. For τ of the form I, ≈ I , the S given by Definition 2.1 only respects = I , so one then defines n S i as ∃i : I. i ≈ I i ∧ n S i to get the appropriate relation that furthermore respects ≈ I .2
In the sequel we construct three triposes each based on a different notion of computation with respect to which effects are directly incorporated into the computational model. Using Lemma 2.3, we demonstrate that varying one's notion of computation wildly affects the validity of CC in the resulting constructive type theory.
In order to avoid digressing into low-level details or metatheoretic concerns, we take ZFC [46] as our prevailing metatheory, though we do make a point to note where this particular choice of metatheory is relevant. All of the following lemmas and theorems have been mechanically verified, with more care taken towards metatheoretic concerns, so we refer readers interested in those details to the Coq proofs [13] or appendices.
Constructivism and Determinism
Realizability is at the heart of constructivism as it captures the notion of extracting (computable) content from proofs. In turn, partial combinatory algebras [15, 17] are at the heart of realizability as they formalize the key components of computation that serve the proofs-as-programs correspondence. Indeed, a topos is called a realizability topos if it can be derived through a standard construction from a partial combinatory algebra. Due to the properties of this construction and of partial combinatory algebras, every realizability topos models CC [47] , supporting the common understanding that CC holds constructively [7, 9, 25, 32, 33, 36, 44 ]. Next we review partial combinatory algebras and the relevant standard constructions, and we illustrate why CC follows from these foundations of constructivism.
Partial Combinatory Algebras
Put simply, a computation accepts inputs and produces outputs. These inputs and outputs can themselves describe computation, i.e. computations are also data. A combinatory algebra formalizes this view, which is critical to developing Turing-complete systems like the λ-calculus, via a set of codes and an ability to apply codes to one another to produce outputs. However, another important aspect of Turing-completeness is that computations may not always manage to actually produce an output, i.e. terminate. A partial combinatory algebra incorporates this by permitting application of codes to be partial.
Partial combinatory algebras are formalized in two steps. The first introduces the concepts of codes and application of codes-known as a partial applicative structure. The second step then ensures that the partial applicative structure has the necessary expressiveness for modeling computational systems like the λ-calculus. Definition 3.1 (Partial Applicative Structure) A partial applicative structure is a set C of "codes" c and a partial binary "application" operator · on C. We use c f · c a ↓ c r to denote c r being the (successful) result of the application c f · c a .
Given a partial applicative structure, one can consider application "expressions" such as (
A partial combinatory algebra is a partial applicative structure that is "functionally complete", meaning there is a way to encode such expressions with n free variables as individual codes accepting n arguments through applications. To present the formal definition, we first formalize expressions e with numbered free variables i ∈ N, substitution e[c a ], and the extension of evaluation to expressions e ↓ c r .
is designed so that defining n ≈ N n as n = N n ∧ n makes N, ≈ N a natural-number object in the constructed topos. Definition 3.2 (Partial Combinatory Algebra) A partial combinatory algebra (PCA) is a partial applicative structure with an assignment of every expression e ∈ E n+1 to a code c λ n .e ∈ C that conceptually embodies the λ-calculus term binding the n + 1 free variables in e, as formalized by the following requirements:
∀n.∀e ∈ E n+2 .∀c a . c λ n+1 .e · c a ↓ c λ n .e [ca] ∀e ∈ E 1 .∀c a , c r .
Perhaps the more standard definition of PCAs is as partial applicative structures with S and K combinators satisfying certain behaviors [47] . These combinators are simply encodings of particular expressions that are sufficient to ensure that all expressions can be encoded. In our formalization, the S and K combinators are simply the codes c λ 2 .(0 · 2) ·(1 · 2) and c λ 1 .0 modeling the λ-calculus terms λx.λy.λz. (x z) (y z) and λx.λy.x, respectively. Similarly, one can define a code c λ n that Church-encodes the natural number n: c
Modeling Higher-Order Logic with PCAs
Given a PCA one can construct its corresponding realizability tripos via a standard construction [47] . The core intuition behind a realizability tripos is that a predicate on a set I specifies for each element i which codes from the PCA serve as realizers that the predicate holds for i, and that one predicate φ entails another ψ when there is a uniform code that converts all the realizers of φ i , i.e. φ(i), to realizers of ψ i for every i in I. Uniformity means that the code does not itself depend on i-the same code must work for all elements of I. Uniformity is critical for ensuring entailment corresponds to computation. To see why, consider the fact that in every realizability tripos there is a predicate on the natural numbers N specifying that its only realizer for a natural number n is its Church encoding c λ n . Given a function f : N → N in the metatheory, we can define another predicate on the natural numbers, call it φ f , whose only realizer for a given n is c λ f (n) . Consider what it means for to entail φ f . If entailment could be evidenced by a different code c n for each n ∈ N, then entails φ f for any function f since c n could be the constant computation that returns c λ f (n) . However, requiring a uniform code that works for all indices n ∈ N ensures the predicate entails φ f if and only if f is computable according to the PCA at hand. Thus uniformity ensures that entailment actually has computational significance.
With these intuitions in mind, we can informally describe how the various propositional connectives are modeled by realizability triposes, with formal descriptions to come as a special case of the more general system in Figure 2 . The realizers of a conjunction φ 1 ∧φ 2 are simply the Church-encoded pairs of realizers of φ 1 and φ 2 . The realizers of an implication φ 1 ⊃ φ 2 are simply the codes that, when applied to a realizer of φ 1 , necessarily produce a realizer of φ 2 . There are no realizers for ⊥, and the realizers of a disjunction φ 1 ∨ φ 2 are the Churchencoded tagged unions of realizers of φ 1 and realizers of φ 2 . A realizer of a universal quantification ∀i:I.φ i (for inhabited I) is anything that is a realizer of φ i for every i ∈ I, whereas a realizer of an existential quantification ∃i:I.φ i is anything that is a realizer of φ i for some i ∈ I. Lastly, any code is a realizer of , and any code is a realizer of i = I i if and only if i and i are equal in I in the metatheory.
Notice that the realizers for the quantifiers are themselves uniform. That is, a realizer of ∃i:I.φ i has no computational way of knowing which i it is a realizer for, and similarly a realizer of ∀i:I.φ i cannot computationally depend on the index i. Thus there is a difference between, for example, realizers of ∀n:N.φ n versus realizers of ∀n:N. n ⊃ φ n . A realizer of the former must be a single code that simultaneously realizes all φ n s, whereas a realizer of the latter is a computation that maps each n to a realizer of φ n .
Countable Choice in Realizability Triposes
Now we consider Countable Choice with this model of higher-order logic in mind. For this, we introduce a new notation, "∃i : I | φ i . ψ i ", indicating that there internally exists an i in I that externally satisfies φ i and internally satisfies ψ i . A realizer of ∃i : I | φ i . ψ i is anything that is a realizer of ψ i for some i ∈ I satisfying φ i . We also denote n R i with R n,i , and we use R n,i (c) to denote that c is a realizer for R n,i . Lemma 3.3 CC is equivalent in every realizability tripos to the following holding for every set I:
Proof [13, E-A3] Given Lemma 2.3, this lemma essentially states that inclusion and determinism can be proven computationally if and only if they can be proven in the metatheory. The backwards direction of this is simple. Unfolding definitions, a realizer of inclusions is a code that uniformly converts realizers of S n,i to realizers of R n,i . If inclusion is provable in the metatheory, then the identity computation exhibits inclusion trivially. Unfolding the definition of determinism, note that the equality predicate = I is computationally vacuous, meaning the realizers have no computational value beyond whether a realizer exists at all. In this case, i = I i has a realizer if and only if i and i are equal (in I) in the metatheory. Consequently, Det is itself computationally vacuous; it has a realizer if and only if S n,i and S n,i both have realizers for a given n only when i equals i in the metatheory. Thus, if determinism is provable in the metatheory, then the identity computation exhibits determinism since equality is realized by anything provided the equality holds. The greater challenge is the forwards direction: showing there is a relation where inclusion and determinism hold in the metatheory whenever there is an appropriate relation where inclusion and determinism are proven computationally. Given a realizer cc of CC and a realizer c R tot of totality for some relation R, then applying cc to c R tot necessarily results in a triple of codes c S incl , c S det , and c S tot that realize inclusion, determinism, and totality, respectively, for some relation S. Define a new relationŜ such thatŜ n,i is realized by c when R n,i is realized by c and S n,i has a realizer (which can be anything). ClearlyŜ is included in R in the metatheory. Similarly, S is determined in the metatheory because it has realizers for n, i and n, i only when S does, which the existence of c Proof [13, E-B1; adapted from 18] By Lemma 3.3, it is sufficient to provide a code that converts realizers that an arbitrary relation R is total into realizers that some metatheoretically-determined subrelation S of R is total. That code is simply the identity computation c λ 0 .0 . To see why, note that the definition of S can depend on the specific realizer c R tot that R is total. By the definition of totality, applying c R tot to the Church encoding of any natural number n must result in a realizer, say c n , of R n,i for some index i ∈ I, without specifying or even necessarily knowing what i is. In fact, the returned code might even be a realizer of R n,i for multiple indices in I. Let i n ∈ I be such a corresponding index for each n ∈ N. 4 Define S n,i to be realized by c n if and only if i equals i n , trivially making S determined. Since each c n is a realizer of R n,in , S is a subrelation of R. Because application is deterministic, applying c R tot to the Church encoding of n will always result in c n and hence always be a realizer of S n,in , thereby realizing totality.
2
Thus all realizability toposes, which by definition are derived from PCAs, necessarily model CC.
Introducing Non-Deterministic Computation
Notice that the fact that application is deterministic is critical to the proof that realizability models exhibit CC. However, as we show next, determinism is entirely irrelevant to the realizability interpretation of higher-order logic. Rather, determinism is simply a historical artifact imposing an artificial constraint, and realizability can actually be similarly formulated on the basis of non-deterministic, i.e. relational, combinatory algebras. Thus, in this section we develop relational combinatory algebras, illustrate how they naturally still form a model of higher-order logic, and demonstrate that this natural generalization has dramatic effect on constructivism, with something as simple as a coin flip changing CC from being necessarily true to being necessarily false.
Relational Combinatory Algebras
In order to directly model non-deterministic computation, we developed relational combinatory algebras (RCAs), a generalization of PCAs in which the application operator is relational rather than functional. Thus applying one code to another can have zero, one, or many possible outcomes. There is a subtlety to address though. Because PCAs are deterministic, if an application results in some code then that application always terminates. However, with RCAs, an application can successfully result in a code on one execution yet fail to terminate on another execution. Thus RCAs need a termination predicate in addition to an application relation. Definition 4.1 (Relational Applicative Structure) A relational applicative structure is a set C of "codes" c, an "application" relation c f · c a ↓ c r , and a "termination" predicate c f · c a ↓ satisfying the following:
For a relational applicative structure, one can extend the termination predicate e↓ to applicative expressions:
Definition 4.2 (Relational Combinatory Algebra) A relational combinatory algebra is a relational applicative structure with an assignment of expressions e ∈ E n+1 to codes c λ n .e ∈ C satisfying the followings:
Each of these definitions are the straightforward generalizations of PCAs to non-terminating non-deterministic computation. That is, PCAs are simply the special case of RCAs in which application is deterministic and implies termination:
Modeling Higher-Order Logic with RCAs
Given an RCA one can construct its corresponding RCA tripos. All truths in this tripos are still realizable, suggesting that having the term "realizability tripos" refer specifically to PCAs is a misnomer. As such, we introduce the more accurate term "PCA tripos" for that particular notion of realizability. The core intuition behind an RCA tripos is exactly the same as for a PCA tripos. A predicate on a set I specifies which codes from the RCA serve as realizers that the predicate holds for a particular element i. A predicate φ entails another predicate ψ when there is a uniform code that for all i ∈ I terminates when applied to any realizer of φ i and any possible resulting code is a realizer of ψ i . The constructions and the proofs are all the same as well, with formal descriptions to come as a special case of the more general system in Figure 2 . Thus the deterministic behavior of PCAs is surprisingly irrelevant to their ability to model higher-order logic (and type theory), suggesting that RCAs are actually a more natural fit for realizability theory.
Refuting Countable Choice with Non-Determinism
This natural generalization of realizability theory, however, has major consequences. In particular, in Figure 1 we present Flip-RCA, an RCA whose corresponding tripos refutes CC simply due to the presence of a coin flip.
Flip-RCA is comprised of three key parts. The first is the λ n .E n+1 construct, which describes a λ-value with n + 1 variables. This construction makes functional completeness trivial, since the code c λ n .e is simply given by λ n .e. The termination and reduction rules are standardly defined to guarantee such codes behave as required by functional completeness.
The second key part is the natural-number codes n and primitives succ and on n do p else p . These are not strictly necessary, but they make the proof much simpler due to the fact that every "primitive" p only accepts inputs and produces outputs of the form n. In particular, on n do p else p emulates the behavior of p on a finite list of inputs n and otherwise defers to p . Also, defining cast(e) as e · succ · 0 provides an expression that evaluates to n whenever the expression e evaluates to the Church encoding of n.
The third key part is flip, the only source of non-determinism in the system that makes this an RCA that is not a PCA. All flip does is non-deterministically evaluate to either 0 or 1. Proof [13, E-C2] The c λ n .e codes are given by the λ n .e codes. 2
This simple coin flip is enough to refute CC. To demonstrate how, we rely on the following lemma capturing the fact that Flip-RCA describes an extensional finitary computational system. In the lemma we useċ to informally denote codes with a "primitive hole" such thatċ[p] denotes the code resulting from filling that hole with the primitive p. The formal definitions are tedious and thus omitted here, but can be found in [13, E-C3] . The lemma states that any reduction involving a primitive follows from only finite interactions with that primitive, and so the reduction can proceed similarly for any other primitive that can also exhibit those same interactions. 
Lemma 4.5 CC is internally equivalent in every RCA tripos to the following holding for every set I:
Proof [13, E-A3] Same definitions of S ⊆ R and Det(S) and proof as with PCAs in Lemma 3.3. 2 Theorem 4.6 There exists a set I for which the negation of CC is internally modeled by the Flip-RCA tripos.
Proof [13, E-C5] We use N as the set I for which we prove this negation. RCA (and PCA) triposes model ¬φ if φ has no realizers. Thus it suffices to show that the existence of a realizer of CC onto N for Flip-RCA leads to a contradiction. By Lemma 4.5, we can do so by showing there is no code that can convert realizers of totality for relations R on N into realizers of totality for some metatheoretically-determined subrelation of R.
Suppose cc is such a code. Consider applying cc to λ There are two particularly important primitives to consider. One is primitives of the form const m , in which caseċ[on n do const 0 else const m ] is a realizer of totality for the relation R n;m whose sole realizer for R n;m n,n is 0 when n is in n and n equals 0, or m when n is not in n and n equals m. This implies thaṫ c tot [on n do const 0 else const m ] is a realizer of totality for some subrelation S n;m of R n;m . Again, since R n;m is a determined relation, one can easily deduce that this implies that c n;m tot =ċ tot [on n do const 0 else const m ] results in m whenever it is applied to a Church encoding of a natural number not in n.
The other important case to consider is the primitive flip. In this case,ċ[on n do const 0 else flip] is a nondeterministic realizer of totality for the relation R N whose sole realizer for R N n,n is n for any n. This implies that c flip tot =ċ[on n do const 0 else flip] is a realizer of totality for some determined subrelation S N of R N . Now consider what happens when we apply c flip tot to some n not in n. We know that c n;m tot · n evaluates to m. Since flip can recreate the input-output behaviors of both const 0 and const 1 , Lemma 4.4 implies that c flip tot · n can evaluate to both 0 and 1. This means that 0 must realize S N n,n0 for some n 0 , and similarly 1 must realize S N n,n1 for some n 1 . Since 0 can only realize R N n,n0 when n 0 equals 0, and S N is a subrelation of R N , this implies n 0 must equal 0, and similarly n 1 must equal 1. Thus both S N n,0 and S N n,1 are realizable. Since the assumed behavior of cc implies that S N is determined, this implies 0 equals 1, thereby producing a contradiction. 2
Interestingly, this proof can easily be modified to show that Flip-RCA refutes even Weak Countable Choice, which states that choice is possible if there is at most one choice to be made across all the countable inputs [10] . Weak Countable Choice is sufficient to unify the various formulations of the reals [10] , thus suggesting that the Cauchy, modulated Cauchy, and Dedekind reals might indeed be distinct in the topos for Flip-RCA.
Introducing Stateful Computation
We have shown that, although non-determinism naturally fits into realizability models of higher-order logic, a flip of a coin can invalidate CC despite it holding so trivially before. Now we demonstrate that further extending the computation system with mutable state can restore CC even in the presence of non-determinism. This means that CC is not wholly incompatible with non-determinism, contrary to Schuster's concern [41].
Stateful Combinatory Algebras
In order to directly model stateful computation, we developed stateful combinatory algebras (SCAs), a generalization of RCAs in which the application operator is stateful. That is, applying one code to another requires a state that it can then mutate. Just as there are PCAs that can model non-deterministic computation [42], PCAs can model state by using, say, the state monad [31] . But it is impossible to force PCA computations to share state-the requirements for the S combinator force it to duplicate any state a PCA computation might be using. SCAs ensure that all computation operates on the same mutating state, which, as we show, is a critical component in their ability to implement CC even in the presence of non-deterministic computation.
Definition 5.1 (Stateful Applicative Structure) A stateful applicative structure is an inhabited set Σ of "states" σ, a "possible future" preorder σ ≤ σ , a set C of "codes" c, 5 an
of "possible futures" here captures the fact that, even in a system with mutable state, the system can maintain certain invariants about its state and how it progresses, as enforced by the preservation property. These invariants will be critical to implementing CC. Note, though, that the application relation and termination predicate are not themselves necessarily preserved by futures; an application is permitted to reduce to a code in a given state that it cannot reduce to in a future state, and a termination only guarantees that the current state can be mutated to provide a result. Thus this is not simply a standard possible-worlds structure [26] .
We extend the definitions of application e ↓ σ σ c r and termination e↓ σ to applicative expressions as follows:
Definition 5.2 (Stateful Combinatory Algebra) A stateful combinatory algebra is a stateful applicative structure with an assignment of every expression e ∈ E n+1 to a code c λ n .e ∈ C satisfying the following properties in all states σ, σ ∈ Σ:
RCAs are the special case of SCAs with precisely one state.
Modeling Higher-Order Logic with SCAs
Since PCAs and RCAs are each special cases of SCAs, we were informal about how they model impredicative higher-order logic. Now we provide a formal description of the model in Figure 2 . One technical note is that types in our model are inhabited sets. This technically means that our model specifies a higher-order fibration [20, Definition 5.3.1] 6 , which is a generalization of a tripos. We do this because it permits a simpler interpretation of universal quantification. Furthermore, the standard tripos-to-topos construction works for any higher-order fibration [20, Corollary 6.1.7], so the applicability to set theory and type theory is maintained. In fact, the resulting topos is equivalent to the topos that would be derived from the tripos construction. Proof [13, D-C1] The remaining components and proofs for a higher-order fibration follow easily from the definitions in Figure 2 . The only thing we prove explicitly here is consistency.
A proposition φ in Figure 2 is realizable if there exists a state σ and code c φ such that φ σ (c φ ) holds. The progress property of SCAs and the definition of entailment in Figure 2 imply that when a proposition entails
Notation
Predicates
The predicate in Γ is realized by (any) c for γ in σ. Conjunction The predicate φ×ψ in Γ is realized by c for γ in σ if the following holds:
Bottom The predicate ⊥ in Γ has no realizers for γ in any σ. Disjunction The predicate φ ∨ ψ in Γ is realized by c λ 1 .1 · c φ for γ in σ if φ σ γ (c φ ) holds, and by c λ 1 .2 · c ψ for γ in σ if ψ σ γ (c ψ ) holds. Implication The predicate φ ⊃ ψ in Γ is realized by c for γ in σ if the following holds:
Universal Quantification For a predicate φ in a context Γ × τ , the predicate ∀τ.φ in Γ is realized by c for γ in σ if ∀x ∈ τ. φ 
Fibration
Type A type τ is an inhabited set. Context A context Γ is an inhabited set. Proposition A proposition φ is a "stateful" predicate on codes φ σ (c) that is "future-stable":
Predicate A predicate φ in context Γ assigns to each inhabitant γ of Γ a proposition φ γ . Entailment A predicate φ entails a predicate ψ in Γ if there exists a code c satisfying the following:
Substitution A substitution t from a context Γ to a context Γ is a function from Γ to Γ . For a predicate φ in context Γ , the substituted predicate φ[t] in Γ is realized by c for γ in σ when φ σ t(γ) (c) holds. Types
Unit The type 1 is the singleton set 1. Product The type τ × τ is the set of pairs τ × τ . Function The type τ → τ is the set of functions τ → τ . Impredicativity The type Ω is the set of future-stable stateful predicates on codes {φ ⊆ Σ × C | φ is future-stable}. another one, realizability of the former implies realizability of the latter. Since the proposition is realizable and the proposition ⊥ is not, cannot entail ⊥, guaranteeing consistency of the model for any SCA. 2
Restoring Countable Choice with State
Next we show that introducing state enables SCA triposes to model CC even in the presence of non-determinism. In particular, we use state to memoize realizers of totality. Memoization [29] (whose original intent was to optimize computation) is the method of wrapping a computation with something that keeps track of inputs already passed to this computation and their corresponding outputs. Most importantly for our purposes, it has the benefit of always providing the same output for a given input even when the generating computation is itself non-deterministic. While we could provide a general proof that a tripos for any SCA with a special memoizing combinator models CC, due to space constraints we simply provide a concrete example of such an SCA. Thus Figure 3 defines Mem-SCA, whose ndnat code provides non-determinism, and whose memo code implements memoization (via lookup codes). Mem-SCA is presented in two parts. We describe the left-hand side of Figure 3 first, which formalizes pre-states and a "frozen" computational system under a given pre-state ς. A pre-state is comprised of an "allocation" table α and a "memoization" table µ. These tables do not necessarily satisfy the invariants of the system that will enable Mem-SCA to model CC, but they are sufficient for specifying a computational system. An entry , c in an allocation table α indicates that the memoizations at location should be generated by code c. An entry , n, c in a memoization table µ indicates that the input n has a memoized output c at location . Consequently, the computational system specifies that memo applied to a code c can reduce to a lookup for any location whose entries should be generated by c according to α. Similarly, the computational system specifies that lookup applied to a Church-encoded natural number n can reduce to a memoized ouput c for input n at location according to µ. The remainder of the computational system behaves as expected for the λ-calculus, with the addition that ndnat can reduce to any Church-encoded natural number.
Note that a pre-state does not actually guarantee that the entries in its memoization table are generated according to its allocation table, nor does it have any notion of mutating state. Both of these issues are addressed by the right-hand side of Figure 3 , which formalizes states and a mutating computational system. A state is a pre-state satisfying additional invariants. First and second, a given location can be generated by at most one code and can have at most one memoized output for each given input. Third, every memoized output Pre-States States is indeed a possible result of applying the input to the generating code. Last, the tables are finite. A state's possible futures are simply all states containing its entries (and possibly more). Termination is straightforward, with the one subtlety that lookup only terminates on inputs that its generating code terminates on. Lastly, mutating reduction does not actually prescribe how the state should be mutated-instead, its effect is that the state can be mutated to any future state provided the application would reduce according to the frozen computational system, i.e. provided the future state has enough entries that the application can reduce without needing to add more entries. This means that the issue of determining actually how to mutate the state such that the reduction can be completed is delegated to the proof of progress.
Lemma 5.4 Mem-SCA is an SCA.
Proof [13, E-D2]
We provide the only interesting aspect of this proof, which is progress. For this, we rely on the fact that c f · c a ↓ ς c r is easily shown to imply c f · c a ↓ ς c r whenever ς contains all the entries in ς. Progress is proven by induction on the proof of termination, the only interesting cases for which are memo and lookup .
Suppose memo · c a ↓ σ holds. We need to provide a state σ and a code c r such that memo · c a ↓ σ σ c r holds. Since α σ is finite, there is an "unused" location . Define ς to be ς σ with , c added to the allocation table, and define c r to be lookup . The required reduction and the fact that the pre-state ς satisfies the requirements to provide a state σ follow easily. Now suppose lookup · c a ↓ σ holds. We need to provide a state σ and a code c r such that lookup · c a ↓ σ σ c r holds. The assumption implies that c a is the Church encoding of some natural number n, that has a corresponding code c f in the allocation table α σ , and that c f · c λ n ↓ σ holds. Since µ σ is finite we can check to see if it has a code c corresponding to and n, in which case σ is simply σ and c r is simply c. Otherwise, by the induction hypothesis c f · c λ n ↓ σ entails the existence of a stateσ and codeĉ such that c f · c λ n ↓ σ σĉ holds. Again, since µσ is finite we can check to see if it has a code c corresponding to and n, in which case σ is simplyσ and c r is simply c . Otherwise, we define ς to be ςσ with ,ĉ added to the allocation table, and we define c r to beĉ. The required reduction and the fact that the pre-state ς satisfies the requirements to provide a state σ follow easily.
Lemma 5.5 CC is internally equivalent in every SCA tripos to the following holding for every set I: Note that the definition of Det(S) in Lemma 5.5 requires realizability of S n,i and S n,i to imply that i and i are equal only if they are realizable in the same state σ. Thus it is perfectly acceptable for S n,i and S n,i to be realizable for distinct i and i in distinct states. Furthermore, totality of S only requires S n,i to eventually be a realizable for some i for each n. Thus S can be non-deterministic across states and be only finitely defined at any particular state, which is how we address the challenges of non-determinism. is a realizer of totality in a given state σ for a relation R. We need to show that memo · c R tot terminates in σ, and that any code it can reduce to in a possible future σ is necessarily a realizer of totality in σ of some determined subrelation of R. Termination is trivial since memo is defined to terminate on all inputs in all states, so reduction is the primary challenge.
By definition, memo · c R tot only reduces to lookup and only in states σ for which , c R tot is in α σ . Thus we need to show that lookup is a realizer of totality in σ for some determined subrelation of R. Let c σ n denote codes for which , n, c σ n ∈ µ σ and σ ≤ σ hold, which (if it exists) is necessarily unique for a given σ . Note that, if c σ n exists, then it is a realizer of R σ n,i for some i. The reason is that, by the required properties of states, in order to be in the memoization table for the code c σ n must be a possible result of applying the generator for (as specified by α) to c are both realizable in a given state σ only when both equal i σ n , ensuring determinism of S. It remains to prove that lookup is a realizer of totality for S. Since c R tot is a realizer of totality in σ , it terminates on all Church-encoded natural-number inputs in σ , which implies lookup does as well. Any code that can result from applying lookup to a c λ n in a possible future σ is necessarily in the memoization table for in σ and therefore equal to c σ n , which by definition is a realizer of S n,i σ n in σ . Thus lookup is a realizer of totality for a determined subrelation of R, and hence memo is a realizer of the proposition in Lemma 5.5, thereby evidencing that the tripos for Mem-SCA models CC.
Although we do not formally develop it here, a similar SCA can even model a principle known as dependent choice (DC), which is strictly stronger than CC [4, 22] . The state provides a table in which each entry of the required sequence is simply generated on demand from the previous one according to the allocated realizer of totality. As with Mem-SCA, this works even in the presence of non-determinism.
Related Work and Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that key principles of constructivism highly depend on the effectful notion of the computation system, using CC as an illustrative example. We show that the traditional constructive proof of CC fundamentally relies upon a deterministic computational system, and that adding even a coin flip entails its negation. We further show that then adding mutable state to the computational system makes it again possible to implement CC. In doing so, the paper extends the boundaries of constructivism towards a truly proofs-as-programs paradigm, not just a proofs-as-deterministic-programs paradigm. This paper focuses on the effect of effects on existing principles of constructivism. Other works similarly each make some choice principle compatible with computations with continuations [3, 16, 30] . Interestingly, despite the difference in goals, these systems use techniques as coinduction, lazy evaluation, and infinite terms that are employed in a manner bearing resemblance to our memoization technique.
It would also be interesting to explore what new principles might be made possible by effects. For example, Bickford et al. [6] explore using the stateful nature of Nuprl's library system to provide free-choice sequences [11] . We suspect these techniques can be combined to model both CC and free choice, and even extended to support notions of choice almost reaching ZFC. 
A Overview
The contributions of this paper have all been mechanically verified. This appendix is intended to let the reader know what exactly has been mechanically verified. In particular, it provides all the relevant formal definitions and formal statements of the lemmas and theorems. It does not, however, walk through the proofs in detail. For that, we refer the interested reader to directly interact with the Coq proofs themselves [13] .
A-A. Conventions
Because Coq does not have quotient types and true subset types (due to the lack of baked-in proof irrelevance with support for unification), we employ a convention of define a type, then a validity predicate on that type, and then an equivalence relation on that type if appropriate. We only use elements of a type that are valid.
A-B. Metatheoretic Assumptions
The proof only makes one metatheoretic assumption, countable choice, in two places: the proof that all PCAs model countable choice, and the proof that Mem-SCA models countable choice.
B Categories

B-A. Common.v
We use Set to ensure that a type belongs to the universe of sets rather than some larger universe. We cannot use the standard Set universe because we need Set to contain Prop to model impredicativity.
Definition Set : Type := Type.
Inductive ∅ : Set :=.
B-B. Categories.v
B-B1. Definition of a Category
This definition is standard. We include here only the structural components so that the reader may be introduced the notation.
Module Type Category. End Category.
B-C. Cartesian.v B-C1. Definition of a Cartesian Category
Module Type CartesianCategory. Include Category.
End CartesianCategory.
B-C2. Definition of a Cartesian-Closed Category
Module Type CartesianClosedCategory. Include CartesianCategory.
End CartesianClosedCategory.
B-C3. Definition of a Nautral-Number Object
Module Type NaturalNumberObject (CC : CartesianCategory).
Parameter N : O.
End NaturalNumberObject.
B-D. Sets.v B-D1. Definition of the Category of Inhabited Sets
Module InhabitedSets <: CartesianClosedCategory.
Record O : Type := { set : Set; set : set → Prop; ≈ set : set → set → Prop }.
Objects are required to be inhabited sets (but not pointed sets), as indicated by sinh. Note that morphisms are not required to preserve the required inhabitant, making this the category of inhabited sets rather than pointed sets.
We omit the remainder of this module as it simply demonstrates that inhabited sets form a cartesian-closed category, which is not novel. Note, though, that the ability to customize the validity predicate and equivalence relation are necessary for this construction.
End InhabitedSets.
Module InhabitedSetsNat <: NaturalNumberObject InhabitedSets.
We omit the contents of this module as they simply demonstrate that inhabited sets have the obvious natural-number object.
End InhabitedSetsNat. Fixpoint V (C : Set) (n : N) : Type := match n with 0 → C | S n → option (V C n) end. Fixpoint vcode {C : Type} (c : C) (n : N) : V C n := match n with 0 → c | S n → Some (vcode c n) end.
C Combinatory Algebras
Inductive E ? {C : Set} {n : N} : Type := evar (c : V C n) | · (e f ea : E ? ). Definition Expr (C : Set) : Type := E ? C 0.
End StatefulApplicativeStructure.
End StatefulApplicativeExpression.
C-D3. Definition of a Stateful Combinatory Algebra
This is the formal statement of Definition 5.2.
Module Type StatefulCombinatoryAlgebra. Include StatefulApplicativeStructure.
Parameter c λ :
Parameter red encode 0 : ∀ σ σ : Σ, ∀ e :
Parameter term encode S :
Parameter term encode 0 : ∀ σ : Σ, ∀ e :
End StatefulCombinatoryAlgebra.
C-E. Lambdas.v
C-E1. Framework for Building Codes with Lambda-Terms and Primitives
Module LambdaTerm.
Defines λ-body expressions L parameterized by a set of codes C, and defines codes C ? parameterized by a set of primitives P such that a code is either a primitive or a λ-code of a λ-body expression.
End LambdaTerm.
C-F. FreeRCA.v C-F1. Framework for Building Relational Combinatory Algebras with Lambda-Terms and Primitives
We elide the construction as it is just tedious and made complex by the fact that there is no direct way to define mutually dependent inductive types or propositions across modules. We only show the module type for specifying the set of primitives and their termination and reduction behavior. End FreeRelationalCombinatoryCode.
Module Type PrimitiveApplicativeStructure.
Parameter P : Set.
Parameter preservation prim : ∀ p f : P , ∀ ca : C ? P , ∀ cr :
End PrimitiveApplicativeStructure.
Module FreeRelationalCombinatoryAlgebra (PAS : PrimitiveApplicativeStructure) <: RelationalCombinatoryAlgebra. Include FreeRelationalCombinatoryCode. Include PAS.
Tediously ties the mutually recursive knot.
End FreeRelationalCombinatoryAlgebra.
C-G. FreeSCA.v
C-G1. Framework for Building Stateful Combinatory Algebras with Lambda-Terms and Primitives
We elide the construction as it is just tedious and made complex by the fact that there is no direct way to define mutually dependent inductive types or propositions across modules. We only show the module type for specifying the set of primitives and their termination and reduction behavior.
Module FreeStatefulCombinatoryCode.
Defines stateful application ↓ λ c and termination ↓ λ for λ-body expressions, and application ↓ C ? c and termination ↓ C ? for codes, each parameterized by application and termination rules for the appropriate unknown sets of codes/primitives and states.
End FreeStatefulCombinatoryCode.
Parameter Σ : Set. Parameter P : Set.
Parameter sinhabited : ∃ σ : Σ, Σ σ.
Parameter preservation prim : ∀ σ : Σ, ∀ p f : P , ∀ ca :
Parameter progress prim : ∀ σ : Σ, ∀ p f : P , ∀ ca : C ? P , Σ σ → P σ p f → C ? ( P σ) ca → ↓ p σ p f ca → ∃ σ : Σ, ∃ cr : C ? P , ↓ p c σ p f ca σ cr .
Module FreeStatefulCombinatoryAlgebra (PAS : PrimitiveApplicativeStructure) <: StatefulCombinatoryAlgebra.
Include FreeStatefulCombinatoryCode.
Include PAS.
End FreeStatefulCombinatoryAlgebra. 
Disjunction
Parameter ∨ : ∀ {o : 1 φ 2 ) ). 
Universal Quantification
